Many Cyrillic letters are Latin-looking, but actually have direct Greek analogues due to the history of the writing system. If you don't know Greek letters, you'd have a hard time guessing р made a 'r' sound. If you do, it's a natural guess.
The rich do not, in general, possess Scrooge McDuck vaults full of "prior government backed currency". The assets of the wealthy are generally real assets and business investments.
Cash is such a poor investment that the word "investment" typically means trying to find something more productive than holding cash. Neither do alternatives to cash have a reliable history of benefitting the poor. In the US there's been lots of attempts at local currencies; they tend to fail naturally without government interference. Recently, cryptographic alternatives to cash have mostly served to benefit crypto barons and scammers.
Hmm. Why should I take this critique as being any more accurate than Bryson, given that the writer says in so many words:
"[...] I - someone who’s far from an expert at linguistics [...]"
The rather sniffy observation about Wikipedia falls very flat as the book was written 10 years before Wikipedia existed!
In fact Bryson wrote his book a good 20 years earlier than this critique so perhaps this huffy person has resources to draw upon that were not available in 1990.
Not that I really expect Bryson's stuff to dot every i and cross every t - he's a humourist.
The writer doesn't claim that Bryson should have consulted Wikipedia, more that the myth that eskimos have 500 words for snow is so famous that the myth itself has a Wikipedia page dedicated to it. The discussion had been going on a long time when Bryson wrote this book, and I remember well being told this as a child in the 80's. To present what was either known as an urban myth or at least under a more nuanced discussion (they do, but it's due to how root words are easier to pluralise, not snow per se) is pretty lazy in a non-fiction book.
It's interesting that all these positions are called "common", but the actual board position might happen zero to one times in a lifetime, and I suspect it's usually zero times.
I noticed something similar when I played contract bridge at a competitive level. A top bridge player might play very roughly on the order of 10,000 hands a year, and vividly recall something that happens on the order of once a year as "oh yeah that's common". Of course I wasn't remotely close to them. But there is something about competitive games that seem to amplify the memory for certain kinds of unusual situations.
(Some people are commenting about under promoting to avoid stalemate traps down the line. I've always been a weak chess player, but... trying to set a stalemate trap after being down a queen, in a non-contrived position, is, like, adult chess players shouldn't do that. In my limited experience.)
> vividly recall something that happens on the order of once a year as "oh yeah that's common".
I mean, think of how many times a typical person has sex in their life. Hopefully they and their partner aren't getting pregnant more than roughly once per year. But somebody getting pregnant after having sex is reasonably defined as common. Certainly common enough that it's something you would consider and take precautions to prevent if you didn't want it to happen.
In ranked chess games, underpromotion happens about 1 in 1000ish games. I imagine it would be more common in high level unranked play. If you play one chess game per day, that's once every 3 years on average. It's not frequent, but I'd describe that as common.
I can't remember where I read or saw this, but it struck me as the obvious key difference: In aviation, procedures and practices are developed in concert with experts in aviation maintenance, aviation engineering, various parts of system design, and the people who fly the darn planes. In medicine, the lobbyists, politicians, and software companies have political and economic incentives and communication structures quite divorced from the practiced expertise of actual end users, not to mention the people being treated. So you have all these 'best practices' being imposed that have little to do with the sorts of best practices health practitioners would do or want to do or what patients need.
This is typical of Covid conspiracy theorists, or conspiracy theorists of any sort: one or two papers on one side prove something, but an overwhelming mountain of evidence on the other side does not prove something. The theorist makes no explanation as to how a planetful of scientists missed the obvious truth that some random dudes found; they just assert that it happened, or make some hand-waving explanation about how an inexplicable planet-wide force of censors is silencing the few unremarkable randos who somehow have the truth.
The first paper seems to claim a very standard cohort study is subject to "immortal time bias", an effect whereby measuring outcomes can seem to change them. The typical example of sampling time bias is that slow-growing cancers are more survivable than fast-growing ones, but also more likely to be measured by a screening, giving a correlation between screening and survivablility. So you get a time effect where more fast-acting cancers do not end up in the measurement, biasing the data.
But in measurements such that one outcome or the other does not bias the odds of that outcome being sampled, there can be no measurement time effect, which is why it's not corrected for in studies like this. The authors do not explain why measurement time effects would have anything to do with detecting or not detecting death rates in the abstract, or anywhere else in the paper, because they are quacks, who apply arbitrary math to get the outcome they want.
As another commenter pointed out, randomized controlled trials -- which cannot possibly have this made-up time effect -- often clearly show a strongly positive effect for vaccination.
Excessive inflation is destructive but it requires a better explanation than that.
In a vacuum, if we all have 3-10% more money and things are 3-10% more expensive, we're not poorer unless there are secondary effects that make us poorer. It's the secondary effects that inflation has on investment, markets, and transfer of wealth that are negative. The effects of debt collapse during economic crisis is a considerably more expensive effect, and not one that's good for the poor, or the rich, or the middle class or anyone.
If you "genuinely cannot understand this", consider that the traditional perspective is that the point of an economy is to produce useful goods and services, not to produce an aesthetically pleasing inflation number. Recall that, in early 2020, markets were facing the greatest panic since the 1929 crash. The debt collapse and deflation that followed then precipitated an enormous amount of misery. I'm personally pretty happy we didn't get another Great Depression; Covid was bad enough without that happening.
To piggy-back, the economy runs on the re-circulation of money and the reluctant to spend/lend money in 1929 contributed to why it was so bad (This is what Bernake got a nobel prize for showing [1]).
So you really want the government to synthetically make the money supply larger so that the lower velocity of money ends up being the "correct" velocity. Its like ordering 2 sides of fries at a restaurant so when somebody takes one of your sides you still end up with the desired amount.
However, since the government doesn't turn off the money printing when the shock is over there really is strong argument that they shouldn't turn it on during the shock because it just makes the next shock even worse.
Not abstractly. Specifically, in the United States, since COVID.
The parent reply hand-waves away a point about bad policy by making an abstract point about inflation from money-printing, as if citizens of the United States are molecules in a thought experiment about the laws of physics, as opposed to individual people affected in specific (differing) ways by policies.
> They seemed very welcoming, sincere, and were kind and patient even when I was basically asserting that several of their beliefs were dumb
I don't think LessWrong is a cult (though certainly some of their offshoots are) but it's worth pointing out this is very characteristic of cult recruiting.
For cultists, recruiting cult fodder is of overriding psychological importance--they are sincere, yes, but the consequences are not what you and I would expect from sincere people. Devotion is not always advantageous.
Are you claiming the New York Times is more likely than a comparable newspaper to fabricate random suggestions about astronauts? This is something they are "known to do"?
If you actually read the article, they include a direct link to the sources they cite and explain specifically what those sources say.
Okay I didn’t have access to paywalled article before.
The NYT article is about one specific study that’s a review of archival material. It doesn’t actually seem to suggest that it was a “publicity stunt” or “theater” as OP suggested. Rather, it says that NASA believed that the threat was very real. The threat was real enough to hold a “high level conference” (held by National Academy of Sciences). The outcome there was also that “the risk was real and the consequences could be profound”.
So, the major spending on the quarantine system wasn’t out of nowhere.
The study conclusion seems to be more that it would be nearly impossible to contain the threat if it existed. But, that wouldn’t mean that the precautions taken were only for show — just that it would be really fucking hard to stop. And with the hypothetical microbe, they couldn’t know anything about means of transmission or lifespan — so the precautions could have some value.
Even in the failure of their quarantine procedure, it still demonstrated that they thought it was (in principle) important:
“24 workers were exposed to the lunar material that the facility’s infrastructure was supposed to protect them from; they had to be quarantined”
It wasn’t security theater so much as it was just quarantine procedure that had many gaps, failures, and trade offs.
When I write in Haskell, I find myself mentally glossing the returned monadic state, along the lines of, "Oh, an M x is just an x that does monady stuff to get the x". This becomes natural once you get the hang of do-notation and sometimes monad combinators. So I'm not really thinking about the monadic state in the return value a lot.
It's not really any less natural than thinking stateful programming, except now the state is a reified thing, which I think is strictly advantageous once you get used to it.
