> I'm aware of loving, which said nothing different? Loving basically said the same thing i did - they need a legitimate state interest. Race based discrimination is not a legitimate state interest. Therefore, this falls.
How is sex-based discrimination in marriage a legitimate state interest but not race-based discrimination in marriage? I'm having trouble seeing how Loving — which overrode states' control over marriage when it was unnecessarily discriminatory — can be a good ruling while Obergefell is a bad ruling because it overrode states' control over marriage when it was unnecessarily discriminatory.
Disclaimers: I'm not a lawyer, and I am 100% in favor of gay marriage.
I read Roberts' dissenting opinion pretty closely, and he discusses Loving several times. His argument doesn't read like a states' right argument at all.
His basic point is that, for better or for worse, the definition of marriage has always been a union between a man and a woman, and that the laws were written with this interpretation in mind. (I agree there, as he provides some good primary sources, and Kennedy's majority opinion acknowledges this fact as well.) We'll call this opposite-sex definition "Marriage" with a capital "M". Roberts also demonstrates that Marriage is a guaranteed right. (The majority agrees there, too.)
In the cases in question, states sought to restrict some people from Marriage, e.g. interracial couples, convicts, etc. These decisions were struck down by the court, because they violated the right to Marriage as it was guaranteed.
The gay marriage issue, however, is different. It does not seek to prevent restrictions on Marriage, but to redefine it to include more people (specifically, opposite genders). Roberts argues that creating rights is not the responsibility of the court, but should instead be handled by the legislative branch.
The majority argues that, even though past litigation and legislation only protected opposite-sex Marriage with a capital "M", it is okay to ignore their intentions if they are harmful or misguided. I think the dissenting justices were wary of doing that, because it goes beyond interpreting the law and wades into writing the law. It's not up to the court to determine what the law should be, only to determine what it is. Otherwise, they're usurping the power of the legislative branch, and thus of we, the people, who elect them.
This is easy:
Race based discrimination is held to a heightened standard.
Sex based discrimination is also.
However, the majority in this case did not hold that this was sex based discrimination (despite arguments that it was).
That would, in fact, have been valid legal reasoning. Holding that it is sex based discrimination and subject to heightened scrutiny under equal protection would be perfectly reasonable.
Instead, they said that the equal protection clause and the substantive due process clause combine in a magical way to give a new right.
How is sex-based discrimination in marriage a legitimate state interest but not race-based discrimination in marriage? I'm having trouble seeing how Loving — which overrode states' control over marriage when it was unnecessarily discriminatory — can be a good ruling while Obergefell is a bad ruling because it overrode states' control over marriage when it was unnecessarily discriminatory.