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As mentioned in other comments, you have to trust Apple to hand you the correct public keys. They could easily MITM you and decrypt the messages on the server if they misrepresent the other party's public key. Additionally, the iMessages you send are signed by your private key, which is probably not something you want.


More to the point, they could be forced under court order (or FAA 702 order etc.) to MITM. This is a cousin to the Lavabit scenario.

Nothing wrong with end-to-end encryption, folks. Why don't we have more of it?


> Nothing wrong with end-to-end encryption, folks. Why don't we have more of it?

Complacency and laziness. There is no excuse.


Well said! :)


> iMessages you send are signed by your private key, which is probably not something you want.

Why not?


Because they can be used against you and you won't be able to deny the message has originated from you, which is a desirable security/privacy property in a messaging app setting. OTR, and mpOTR[1] in particular, try hard to remove non-repudiability from messages.

[1]: http://www.cypherpunks.ca/~iang/pubs/mpotr.pdf


I always thought non-repudiability was desirable and what whistleblowers need is anonymity. Thanks for that link.


To be clear, it's a desirable property that parties engaging in a conversation are able to verify authenticity of messages and that they indeed originated from their authors. It is undesirable that the parties of the conversation are able to definitively prove to a third party, not involved in the conversation, that a message was indeed originated from a specific person.




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