There are a variety of theoretical attacks on EMV cards. Some involve compromised reader devices. Some involve ingenious card-like devices that talk wirelessly to a device containging the real card and change some of the data exchange going back and forth. This may allow some transactions to circumvent PIN or other validation but all requires the original, stolen card.

One I just read about (yescard) could allow you to clone a card and could be used (most likely) for a half dozen low-value offline transactions. But it has no keys so can't fool the bank.

You can get a card reader/writer on the open market for about $10. Writeable cards will cost you a little more. Problem is that the card you want to clone isn't going to give up the goods in terms of private keys, PIN validation data etc, so like the yescard, it's going to be of very limited use.

It's not too strong to say that - they've been used for many years, there are decent financial incentives for organized crime to clone the cards, but the industry hasn't seen any "chip skimmer" yet.

I think you're going to have a very hard time cloning them. Security researchers have worked on this for years, while the card manufacturers have learnt from their mistakes and adapted.

I can't wait until version 2.0 comes out and they send you a padded envelope in which you're supposed to ship to them all your chip and pin cards so they can clone them into your device.