They had a strategy that was designed to hold ground (the OP said the strategy wasn't deigned to hold ground).

The strategy failed. That doesn't mean it didn't exist.

I see what you're saying, but I'd argue that it wasn't a strategy for near on a decade until the top brass had to start facing the hard reality of the complete bankruptcy and failure of the original strategy. Perhaps the pendulum is swinging the other way?

2001-2002: Invasion and mostly conventional warfare against the Taliban. Successful.

2002-2005: Reduction in troop numbers. Total disaster.

2006-2010: Increase in troop numbers. "Control the ground" strategy implemented. Some initial successes, but many failures.

2011-present: Troop draw-down. This is pretty much code for "hand control back to the Taliban".

Destroying things is what armies are good at. They pretty effectively destroyed the Taliban early on. But, then, I think, it came home to roost that you can't just destroy something and then leave and expect everything to be fine if there was never anything to take the place of the thing you destroyed. We've been trying to solve that puzzle ever since.

1% false 99% of the time