It concerns me how casual the article and some of the comments here discuss an actual war against China, as if that were a reasonable scenario.
Of course I understand wanting to be prepared even for grim scenarios such as these. Military strategists should of course continually be refining such plans. But casual discussions like this, without even so much as a disclaimer about it being a hypothetical and extremely undesirable outcome, may pave the way towards it through normalization.
A general war against China is impossible. But a "limited" war fought over Taiwan isn't beyond the realm of possibility.
Which does take it into a kind of Schroedinger's realm. The US takes it seriously, so it develops technology for it, and China doesn't invade. But would China have invaded if the US hadn't prepared for that war? Quite possibly, but you can never know.
In the quite likely scenario that Iran goes on any longer, the US will become so war exhausted that we will be unable to provide any support for Taiwan.
The Iran war is a skirmish by any reasonable measure. It does not exhaust either the US Navy or the Airforce, and the Army isn't even participating.
Now I understand it has a large impact because of oil prices and the closing of the strait of hormuz, but don't confuse the economic impact of the closing of shipping lanes with something that "exhausts" the US military.
Remember this is the military that spent two decades in Afghanistan and Iraq, using considerably more resources. Those were actual wars, followed by occupations that lasted two decades. And that didn't exhaust the US.
In terms of the Naval cost, it is occupying 15% of ships, with zero ships sunk or damaged. I believe there were 13 soldiers killed during strikes on bases in the area. Those bases have been manned for decades and have not exhausted the US Army. Let's maintain some perspective.
Reports are that the US has exhausted certain key capabilities such as high end missiles and interceptors. We've likely used more interceptors in a month against a fourth rate power than Ukraine has in their entire war against Russia. That's extremely damning and irresponsible from a strategic perspective.
Exhausting key functionality like that will absolutely lead to major losses of things like manpower and ships against a near-peer adversary.
We were burning a year worth of global patriot manufacturing capacity every day at the beginning of the war. Math says we slowed down and are also running out.
This is a misconception, and honestly it's hubris talking. The US has already burned through a big chunk of its key munitions. More than half of its THAAD interceptors, about a quarter of its Patriot stock, roughly 1,000 total with limited yearly production, and a serious slice of Tomahawks, some of which will take years to replace.
Even with ramp ups, you are looking at 3 to 4 years before extra production actually shows up. And for the really constrained systems like GBU-57, cruise missiles tied to Williams engines, or anything needing Chinese gallium, even that timeline is probably optimistic if China keeps export controls in place.
And this constant comparison to Iraq or Afghanistan just does not hold up. Those were wars where the US could sit in safe zones and strike from distance. A Taiwan scenario is completely different. It is right on China’s doorstep, against a peer the US has never actually faced at this scale. Even the USSR was not comparable in terms of economic integration or industrial strength.
edit:
If the ceasefire collapses this Wednesday as Trump has signaled, these numbers will start moving again, and the replacement time estimates will only get worse because the industrial base hasn't yet begun delivering against any of the surge contracts
Also, there is a 0% chance that China has not been closely observing this and updating their plans in case we end up in a hot war. Unlike Iran, they have the resources to mount serious attacks on supply chains, electronic attacks on support infrastructure, and overwhelm defenses – if it came to a head in Taiwan, they’d be willing to trade an uneven number of drones and modern fighters (both significantly outclassing Iran in quality and quantity) to take out hard to replace things like AWACS or THAAD radars. The difference in resupply distance is heavily B skewed in their favor.
I can't see the interceptor burn through being so low. Doctrine is 2-4 missiles per ballistic target. I've know the OSINT kids have a hard time with something like this since it's all classified and compared to Ukraine much harder to get visual confirmation, but I suspect Patriot use much higher. Hopefully the US has been using more of the PAC-2 than PAC-3 but they may have not been that discreet.
The asymmetry with Iraq goes both ways. In Iraq, the goal was regime change and occupation. In Taiwan, the goal is to disrupt the most difficult type of military operation in existence (opposed landing). No one is planning to roll Abramses into Beijing.
I would dispute the depletion of expensive munitions, but I still believe that is largely irrelevant next to political exhaustion.
I do not think most Americans would care to defend Taiwan, even against the China boogeyman. The practical realities of losing Chinese goods would be a devastating reality few are prepared to face.
I think people are pointing out how little it actually takes to wage this war against Iran and that there are basically zero costs to the USA to do so. A classic "political exhaustion" requires some degree of meaningful hardship on the USA and a slight gas price increase just isn't enough.
The reality of losing TSMC is no joke either. I remember Covid times when many G20 leaders went to Taiwan begging for some chips so that they could keep exporting cars and other things that need computer chips.
I mean it's literally beholden to the USA congress and it's most meaningful parts are made in the USA. There is a reason why they fall in line with every USA export control and restriction.
If ASML is Europe's then I'd say all of Europe is the USA's.
I agree, political exhaustion is the real constraint.
I personally would not be willing to do anything to defend Taiwan from China. But then again, I don't support any of the wars we fought in the middle east, either.
JP Morgan is predicting $5/gallon gas. Apparently gas prices are one of the best indicators to predict presidential support. In normal times, this seems unfair-lots of external factors can influence gas prices. Rare that you can so directly point towards administration action causing an effect.
Every day this conflict continues is going to have devastating political outcomes. I largely subscribe to the belief that Kamala losing was a reflection that people were mad at inflation.
The problem here is that gas prices have bifurcated to the point that an "average" doesn't mean much. I'm pretty sure I know how California will vote regardless of the gas price, but gas in Texas and much of the midwest will remain cheap.
For sure. I am in SoCal, and when I hear people complaining of the “$4 gas”, I can only laugh. I still believe the average represents a real increase being borne across the country, even if it is felt unevenly.
Gas is Texas is not that much cheaper than national average and will hit $4 soon if this “war” continues. I have several friends in Texas who are livid about gas prices.
I get what you are saying, and I was sympathetic to this view in the Ukraine war (where we gave orders of magnitude more munitions than have been spent on Iran).
At that time, I believed it "We are running out of missiles, we are running out of shells", etc.
But it turns out the US adapted. They increased production, they substituted for next best options, they got other countries to produce for us, and still we have not run out. Not after years of Ukraine.
So I am no longer on the "US is running out of munitions" bandwagon. Plus, this military spending increases productive capacity.
Take a peek at last year's budget for missile production. It's amazingly small, and the production capacity is limited as well. RTX makes both Patriot and SM2/3 missiles, and production is so low that the Navy is going to be using the Patriot in its VLS launchers.
Lockheed makes THAAD, around 100/year. That's nothing. A veritable drop in the bucket.
PAC-3 production MIGHT hit 650 this year, with a goal of 2000 per annum by 2033!!!
SM-6 is about 300/year, and they're hoping to get to 500/year by roughly the same timeframe.
SM-3 is even lower at maybe 75/year. The USN has just never prioritized filling their weapons magazines.
It's hard to know what missiles were expended in the current Iran War, but you can figure out how many were purchased over the years since it's public info. Then subtract what's been used for training, fighting the Houthis in Yemen etc.
Before the war started, total purchases of all PAC-3 were approximately 2500. Some of these were used in training, some donated to Ukraine, and some were part of FMS.
Approximately 500 SM-3 missiles have been delivered. Approximately 1100 SM-6 missiles have been delivered.The majority of both the SM-3 and SM-6 are used by the USN, though some allies have made small purchases of both.
Unclassified estimates have Iran launching over 3000 ballistic missiles and 4500 drones. US policy for BMs is two missiles each. Not all of these would have been engaged by the US (Israeli systems such as Arrow etc would be tasked with missiles targeting Israel, though Israel also has Patriot through FMS). But it's easy to see where 3000 to 4000 interceptor missiles could have been consumed.
Now add in what the USN burned through in the Red Sea when the Houthis started targeting shipping and it's easy to be concerned about magazine depth.
And this is just interceptors. It doesn't count Tomahawks, JAASM, etc.
I don't think the US will become too war exhausted for another war. We just got out of one and we're back in one again. Taiwan would get politicians and people fired up.
US will start a draft and turn up more warfighting manufacturing. They have no way to respond to things other than with violence. Of course they'll lose the fight for Taiwan, but America has no problem fighting stupid wars they then lose.
> It concerns me how casual the article and some of the comments here discuss an actual war against China, as if that were a reasonable scenario.
The last few wars started by the US were based on scenarios that looked good on paper and in reality they did not went so well.
Look at the Iran war: "we're gonna kill their supreme leader and the regime will fall". Almost two months later nothing changed in any significant way despite bombing it relentlessly.
Coming back to your concern, I'm pretty sure some people at the Pentagon believe the US can fight China using an expeditionary force and somehow win.
The Iran War never looked good on paper. The only people who thought it would succeed were Trump and the cast of characters he surrounded himself with. I doubt if many congressional Republican chickenhawks thought it would succeed.
The only way to oust the regime is with ground troops, ripping out the Revolutionary Guard and its tentacles. For all its corruption, Iran is far from a failed state, and there aren't factions waiting in the wings, ready and willing to take over the government with force. (There are political factions, to be sure, but they're already integrated into the government, though without leverage over the Revolutionary Guard.) The only armed group remotely capable of even trying would be the Kurds, but the US and in particular Trump screwed them over in the past, multiple times. Even if they thought they could go it alone (which they couldn't), there was zero chance they were going to enter the fray without the US committing itself fully with their own invasion force (i.e. success was guaranteed), because failure would mean ethnic Kurds would be extirpated from Iran, and might induce Iraq and Syria to revisit the question of Kurdish loyalty to their own states. And, indeed, Kurdish groups took a wait and see approach, assembling some forces but waiting to see how the US played their cards.
It's just so ridiculous. Nobody is going to be writing books about the mistakes or hubris of US intelligence, military strategists, or political scholars and analysts. Even the most diehard American proponents of regime change in Iran, at least those with any competence, could have predicted (and did predict) this outcome. This was 100% a Trump fiasco, though the whole country shares some culpability for this kind of epic failure by allowing someone like Trump to win the presidency... again.
It's a little ironic that its due in part[1] to Trump's reticence to commit ground forces that we've come to this pass. I hesitate to criticize that disposition, but at the same time it's malfeasance to start a war without being willing and able to fully commit to the objective.
[1] Assuming the war had to happen, which of course it didn't.
> The Iran War never looked good on paper. The only people who thought it would succeed were Trump and the cast of characters he surrounded himself with.
Not to nitpick, but “looked good on paper” was an euphemism for “the powers that be think its doable”. Amd yes, yiu are right: Trump surrounded himself with “loyalist” this time that won’t go against hime like in the previous administration, but with the very undesirable effect of amplifying the echo chamber he lives in.
And like someone said in this thread, lots of hubris.
I am no expert on Iran, but all documentaries that I’ve seen about this reach the same conclusion: you don’t invade Iran using ground forces.
An invasion likely would turn into a quagmire, but what keeps regime proponents eternally hopeful is that unlike Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, etc, Iran has a robust political system. The dictatorship notwithstanding, it has a vibrant parliament and, by global standards, a decent electoral system. The Ayatollah rules by following the maxim, keep your friends close and your enemies closer. If you could excise the Revolutionary Guard (a big if), you wouldn't necessarily need to change the government or its institutions. The existing liberal and moderate factions could quickly fill the vacuum, and would be happy to do so. You wouldn't get a pliant Iran, but that's for the better.
So by invasion the idea would be to rapidly, physically excise the apparatus the Ayatollahs use to maintain control. The structure and identity of that group is well known. It's a large group, and you couldn't catch all the leaders, but so long as you can stop their ability to enforce their rule through execution, you give the rest of the country time to shut them out of the institutions. In theory just weeks.
The problem is the very thing that makes regime change a plausibly good idea--a stable polity and modern, liberal-ish institutions--is the very thing that could result in failure. The Ayatollahs understood that a fragile, backwards system would be a weakness to their rule. Their military and bureaucracy are professional; they know how to follow orders, without being micromanaged, and even if everyone wants regime change, there's a huge collective action problem.
The iran war - for all it was a bad idea eliminated a lot of iran's war capacity which seems to be the real goal - near as anyone can tell what they were. Regime change would be nice, but needs more than the us was ever gave indication they would do.
the followon effects like the closing of the straight were obvious which is why few Iran hatehs thought it was a good idea
The estimates I’ve seen say they lost/used 33% of their conventional capacity, 33% was rendered inoperable but recoverable.
I’d guess with the ceasefire, they’re probably back to 40-50% online.
The nuclear capability story is even worse: they were mostly mothballed prewar, suffered partial refinement damage and minimal stockpile loss. Refinement will be back online sometime in the next few years (unless this is a forever war), with weapons following shortly after that.
> It concerns me how casual the article and some of the comments here discuss an actual war against China, as if that were a reasonable scenario.
It’ll be more concerning if wasn’t discussed in such a way. War is rarely reasonable. China doesn’t find it unreasonable to go to war over Taiwan. And for what? National pride and unity? It’s completely unreasonable, but everything they’re developing militarily is exactly for that. We must approach the subject clearly and explore every possibility as a real one. These discussions are about ending wars as quickly and decisively as possible while causing the minimal amount death.
> an actual war against China, as if that were a reasonable scenario.
Most modern military planning considers it a foregone conclusion. Whether that's accurate or not is arguable, but approaching discussions of military spending from a perspective grounded in current planning is certainly reasonable.
So .. ICBM nuclear exchange? Or are we suddenly expecting a large conventional war between nuclear powers in which both sides decide not to bother with them?
Military planners may believe it to be inevitable, the interesting question to chase is why they think that and who the aggressor would be and in response to what.
That aside, it would likely be unconvential and ground breaking in several respects, eg: likely the first conflict with a large initial space based element, each country wanting to blind the other, with each having large constellations of satellites.
Killing farout geostationary spy sats wouldn't be visible .. but fragging the entire LEO space with "sufficient shrapnel" to initiate a cascading sat failure should(?) make for an interesting global skyshow.
The more I read about it, the more firmly I believe it is in the U.S.’s best interest to avoid military conflict with the world’s only manufacturing superpower.
Not that we could afford wars with non-superpowers either.
The days of China manufacturing cheap junk is long past. These same arguments were made against Japan. Look at a BYD EV and it will have a fit and finish comparable to any US manufacturer. In aviation, they're catching up quickly to the US, and are arguably ahead of Europe and Russia.
I suppose visible is subjective. But they are also key component and raw material suppliers for essentially everything high value as well. The west simply does not have the heavy industrial or resource extraction base to account for anything else to be the case. Every time I’ve looked into literally any product China is at the start of the supply chain if lot much further into it.
And yes, I am alleging outright fraud and misrepresentation when it comes to stuff supposedly required to be entirely domestically sourced due to national security. If China froze all exports to the US and its allies, the US manufacturing base would simply cease to exist in rather short order. The China link might be 35 steps down the supply chain and buried 4 countries deep - but it’s almost always there.
The military is concerned about that and developing alternatives where there is real risk. The supply chain is global and china too has areas where they are missing something critical.
We’re a fading manufacturing power and corporate profit-maximization since the 80s has made things very brittle. The most obvious example for HN is semiconductors but there are many other things which we either don’t make in sufficient quantity at all or which have significant dependencies on countries like China. In a war, it doesn’t help, if, say your factory is in Utah when it depends on Chinese rare earth until someone spends 5-10 years getting a new mining & refining supply chain online.
It does if you’ve read anything about how much of China’s advantage is colocation and integration: those long supply chains add delay and cost. Apple rather famously had problems manufacturing the MacPro in Texas not because of anything exotic but from challenges getting basic things like screws which were easily available near their factories in China.
Of course I understand wanting to be prepared even for grim scenarios such as these. Military strategists should of course continually be refining such plans. But casual discussions like this, without even so much as a disclaimer about it being a hypothetical and extremely undesirable outcome, may pave the way towards it through normalization.