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There's no good reason to believe that quantum computers will break modern cryptography.

Shor's algorithm requires that a quantum Fourier transform is applied to the integer to be factored. The QFT essentially takes quantum data with a representation that mirrors ordinary binary, and maps it to a representation that encodes information in quantum phase (an angle).

The precision in phase needed to perform an accurate QFT scales EXPONENTIALLY with the number of qubits you're trying to transform. You manage to develop a quantum computer capable of factoring my keys? Fine, I'll add 11 bits to my key length, come back when you've developed a computer with 2000x the phase precision.



Even though I agree with you, I totally understand why the push for at least hybrid algorithms. We just don't know how quantum computers could feasibly scale. Until we know for sure that cracking existing crypto systems really is infeasible for physical reasons, using hybrid systems that provide an extra layer of security just seems like obvious good practice.


At the same time it's very suspicious how a few three-letter agencies are pushing for total deprecation of non-PQ algorithms, even in hybrids.


Transitions takes decades especially when silicon and networks are involved (eg secure boot and MTU). Most of us would rather just stick with a handful of ciphers than constantly changing (crypto agile has become crypto chaos).


> We just don't know how quantum computers could feasibly scale.

We know. They are not able yet to emulate an i4004, let alone be a treat to "computing".


> We know.

We know that current quantum computers are very weak. We do not know what is physically possible, or even feasible. Quantum computers today struggle with decoherence, but we really genuinely don't know for sure if they always will or if there is a way to overcome it. We have not hit a point where we believe we are up against hard physical limitations that can never be overcome.

> They are not able yet to emulate an i4004, let alone be a treat [sic] to "computing".

I am skeptical this is a good benchmark, though. How many logical qubits do you reckon it would take to emulate an i4004? I don't have the answer, but I wouldn't be surprised if you need less to do something interesting that a classical computer can't reasonably.


> Fine, I'll add 11 bits to my key length, come back when you've developed a computer with 2000x the phase precision.

the really weird thing it's what this isn't true. we already have quantum error correction schemes that can take a quantum computer with O(1) error and get O(exp(-k)) error with polylog(k) inaccurate qbits (and we have empirical evidence that these schemes work to correct the error of single digit numbers of qbits already). adding 11 bits to the key adds ~12 logical qbits or ~a hundred physical qbits to the side of the QC


Would you mind linking a paper on one of the schemes you're referring to?


https://arxiv.org/pdf/1208.0928 is a pretty good into to surface codes.

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-024-08449-y is a paper that shows surface codes work on real computers.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917v1 is the most recent costing of factoring various size of N using all the recent papers on optimizing the logical qbit counts.


Regulators require a transition to quantum-safe algorithms. In the EU, systems labeled as "highly important" must complete the transition by 2030; so you have to do it regardless of how quantum computers evolve.


Perhaps regulators shouldn't require that transition?


> The precision in phase needed to perform an accurate QFT scales EXPONENTIALLY with the number of qubits you're trying to transform.

This is false.

The gates that appear in the textbook QFT circuit (such as the one shown on wikipedia [1]) do mention angles that are exponentially small in N (the number of qubits being operated upon). That may be what's confusing you. But it's well known that the tolerance on those rotations is high, meaning that simply skipping all the exponentially tiny rotations introduces negligible error [2][3].

Here's a simple model. Each time you get a rotation off by an angle of X, add X to the "total algorithm rotation error" R. The chance of an algorithm failing is at most R^2. For example, if R is less than 1 degree then the chance of algorithm failure will be less than 0.03%. That's an acceptable retry chance for Shor's algorithm. The QFT circuit on N qubits performs less than N^2 rotations. So, for R to be less than 1 degree, it's sufficient for each rotation's error X to be less than (1°)/N^2. Therefore the required precision only increases polynomially (like N^2) instead of exponentially (like 2^N). Note the required precision can be improved from O(1/N^2) to O(1/N) using techniques like the qubit recycling QFT [4].

Actually, even if the required precision scaled exponentially, that still wouldn't be an insurmountable problem. Quantum error correction achieves exponentially tighter tolerances from polynomially increasing resources. For example, Ross and Selinger proved that continuous rotations can be approximated to a target error of epsilon using O(log(1/epsilon)) gates from the discrete gate set Clifford+T [4]. And Clifford gates with error below epsilon can be achieved in the surface code using O(log(1/epsilon)^2) noisy qubits for O(log(1/epsilon)) time [5]. And T gates can be achieved by using those reliable Clifford gates to perform magic state distillation of log(1/epsilon)^O(1) T states [6]. Since everything scales polynomially in log(1/epsilon), making epsilon exponentially smaller adds polynomial resources.

There is no part of Shor's algorithm that requires resources growing exponentially in n (the number of digits of the number being factored). The practical scaling is more like n^3: factoring a number that's twice as large can be done with ~two times as many qubits running for ~four times as long. Even if the qubits are noisy [7].

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_Fourier_transform#/med...

[2]: https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0306018

[3]: https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9601018

[4]: https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9903071#page=12

[5]: https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.0928

[6]: https://arxiv.org/abs/1209.2426

[7]: https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09749


> There's no good reason to believe that quantum computers will break modern cryptography.

Nobody needs them The 5 eyes already have access to root certs and internet nodes.

What it _really_ matters is that you are secure, and terrorists and pedofiles stand no chance. At least in theory. /s




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