If we define truth as "Whatever a majority happens to agree with" and the marketplace of ideas as a contest to create truth by building a majority consensus, then you're correct.
If we define truth as something real, and something that we determine based on evidence and correspondence with reality, then you absolutely need some shared epistemological standards for what constitutes evidence and correspondence. I'm not sure if you need peer review for everything, but building expertise in those epistemological standards and approaches _is_ a requirement for well functioning marketplace of ideas, especially if our goal is to develop and understand the truth.
This is distinct from free speech -- I wouldn't want to impose restrictions on one's ability to speak, but that's not the same as saying all speech is equally valid in the pursuit of truth.
> If we define truth as "Whatever a majority happens to agree with" and the marketplace of ideas as a contest to create truth by building a majority consensus, then you're correct.
This is semantic posturing, as, at the end of the day, any "truth" will always require some degree of consensus. Even in the hardest of sciences, we must agree to some (definitionally unprovable) axioms by consensus. Logical positivism died many years ago (though I do know modern-day "rationalists" are attempting to reanimate its corpse).
This is basically what I'm saying -- you need consensus on the standards of evidence and the procedures for accepting evidence. Not just "argue whatever with no standards and see what sticks". The axioms are not chosen just on pure consensus without their own epistemological standards and evaluations.
It's fair to critique arguments or debate formats that do not establish those standards, or which throw out agreed upon standards with no basis, as not really participating in a marketplace of ideas.
> The axioms are not chosen just on pure consensus without their own epistemological standards and evaluations.
I have a hard time seeing if this is true or not. The Axiom of Choice, for example, has reached consensus because of its usefulness, not necessarily because of any epistemological standards. I guess "doing more math" is a bit of an epistemological standard, but AC also leads to all kinds of weird stuff (Tarski's paradox, etc.), so I'm not sure if that's a pro or a con. To me, AC seems more ad hoc than not.
But the more salient point here is that you can have people that vehemently disagree with AC (and a minority of mathmaticians do). Now, I'm not arguing that Charlie Kirk is some intellectual giant here, nor was he even a conservative thought leader (like Scalia was, for example). But, and admittedly this is a pretty soft argument, I'd rather err on letting him do his thing rather than stifling his speech by arguing that he's somehow orthogonal to the marketplace of ideas. I think J.S. Mill would agree. To me, even the homeless weirdo yelling "THE END IS NIGH" at the street corner seems to be a part of that marketplace.
Do I believe that C. S. Lewis has more interesting things to say about Christian doctrine than Charlie Kirk; or that Alvin Plantinga makes better arguments than Ben Shapiro? I do, but that doesn't make Kirk's or Shapiro's speech less "speech-y."
> The Axiom of Choice, for example, has reached consensus because of its usefulness, not necessarily because of any epistemological standards.
Usefulness in proofs _is_ an epistemological standard. Axioms are evaluated based on how they impact mathematical proofs and their compatibility with other axioms, and mathematical disagreements with the Axiom of Choice also follow similar epistemological standards and procedures. We take Banach-Tarski seriously because it meets the standards.
If you wanted to make an argument that "The Axiom of Choice is nonsense" and be taken seriously, you would be expected to show how it is incompatible with other axioms, or how it generates a paradox. You wouldn't be arrested or silenced if you went around denouncing the axiom of choice without following these standards, but you would (rightfully) not be taken seriously.
Similarly, the article isn't saying CK should have been silenced or had his speech stifled, but it is objecting to the notion that what he did was real debate or real intellectual discourse. I don't think that argument equates to stifling speech.
If we define truth as something real, and something that we determine based on evidence and correspondence with reality, then you absolutely need some shared epistemological standards for what constitutes evidence and correspondence. I'm not sure if you need peer review for everything, but building expertise in those epistemological standards and approaches _is_ a requirement for well functioning marketplace of ideas, especially if our goal is to develop and understand the truth.
This is distinct from free speech -- I wouldn't want to impose restrictions on one's ability to speak, but that's not the same as saying all speech is equally valid in the pursuit of truth.