Russia is still structured as an empire, though the fraction of ethnic Russians is relatively high, historically speaking. That, together with its large size, requires a large section of the economy be slaved to the security sector.
Frankly, Russia as a Chinese suzerainty might be one of the more productive alignments for the global economy, even if it isn’t great for America.
For those interested in a more analytical approach, this article/youTube video explains how the geographical vulnerability of Russia's western borders has led to both its high degree of overall militarization as well as its extreme sensitivity over Ukraine in particular:
The paradox of Russian borders is that at the current border, and also beyond it, are flat plains. So as soon as they create a "buffer zone" (let's not dwell on what that means for the people in said "buffer zone"), they create a new border... on the same flat indefensible plain. So the next policy goal is to extend the border, etc.
Say Russia achieves is "geographic necessity" of conquering Ukraine (which I very much wish doesn't happen). What's beyond there? Romania is a mix of plains and mountains - so what, Russia gets to invade there? Poland is mostly flat and with few major obstacles (Vistula running south-north is probably the only major one - and a very topical one...). So then what - extend the "buffer zone" into Germany? And... Finland? And I mean, you can't trust these warmongering Swedes and Norwegian - remember the Vikings? Better pacify these guys too before it's too late.
It's not a logic anyone outside of Russia wants to entertain.
> geographical vulnerability of Russia's western border
This is Russia's argument, but it is nonsense. Nobody would attack any Russian border, western or otherwise, because Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons. It's as simple as that.
Nuclear weapons prevent an all-out invasion, but they're not much good at anything else. The US, for example, could not have used nuclear weapons in Afghanistan or Iraq.
The US is something of an outlier. Most countries maintain much smaller militaries. They have them on hand for a variety of purposes: disasters, foreign peacekeeping, border patrol, and keeping their hand in Just In Case.
NATO countries, for example, are supposed to keep militaries so that Russia doesn't get any ideas. Say, Wagner troops meander across the border into Poland. Russia clutches its pearls and says, "Oh, no, don't end the entire world by nuking us even though it's obvious that we ordered it." So troops would get sent... which is why it never actually happens.
How much military you need to achieve that is up for debate. The US often claims that other NATO countries need more, and that the European countries are relying on America to provide most of that deterrent. But the US is almost certainly providing way, way, way more deterrent than is needed -- more about national preening than serious consideration of needs.
That was what I was trying to explain. Nukes are a blunt weapon, and they want to have a bit more precision. They're not going to nuke Russia if Wagner group made a little, deniable cross-border excursion.
Nukes get MAD real fast. If their only weapon is a nuke, their bluff could easily be called.
Very few countries spend 4% of GDP on the military, and most of them are at war. Not even the US, which comes in at 3.5%. NATO countries are supposed to spend (IIRC) 2%, but most don't.
It's a 2% that they might like to have back, but militaries are pretty good make-work programs. Even Japan, whose constitution prevents it from having a military, still spends 1% on its military.
Not clear what your point is? Are you saying that indeed there was any chance of Nato invading Russia? I think that was what you're implying, but I'm not sure, since you replied to me with a question.
Do you have any scenario of how that would happen, so that Russia's invasion of Ukraine makes any sense as a preemptive move?
What? With this [1] comment? Look at the time stamps. (Do we know each other?)
> Don't you have anything at all nice to say about them?
About the current Russian state? No. It’s pathetic and broken, and I don’t see a way to fix it other than devolving it—functionally, not legally—to China.
About Russia as a culture, people and nation? Of course. Russian literature from the classics (Turgenev) to mid-century (Bulgakov) and modern, together with Soviet films, are among my favourite genres. I love the food. I adore the operas and music. And Russians’ sense of wit and humour is among the sharpest and funniest in the world. As a species also we’re eternally in the Soviet Union’s debt for their aerospace and medical advances, to say nothing of dealing the death blow to the Nazis at Leningrad.
Much of my bitterness towards Moscow stems from knowledge of the potential of Russia’s people that is being squandered, delayed or permanently destroyed, in service of delusions.
Frankly, Russia as a Chinese suzerainty might be one of the more productive alignments for the global economy, even if it isn’t great for America.