Is there any indication that MCAS is a problem when it is provided with accurate AOA data? I don't think so, but I'm willing to be educated.
My understanding is that MCAS only goes haywire when it gets haywire sensor data--specifically, data that indicate an AOA that is much higher than reality.
So much depends on the investigations, which are currently in progress. But it seems possible that the technical solution could simply be: require 3 AOA sensors and require agreement between 2 out of 3 to activate MCAS. Of course, there are probably significant business and regulatory issues to consider/fix as well.
Yes, but there's also the problem of just how haywire it goes --- forcing the horizontal stabilizer in an unflyable position from which it can't be moved (the subject of this article).
I'm not sure how easy it is to just bolt a third AoA sensor onto an existing airframe. OTOH, the MCAS system could at least be redesigned to take BOTH AoA sensors into account.
My understanding is that MCAS only goes haywire when it gets haywire sensor data--specifically, data that indicate an AOA that is much higher than reality.
So much depends on the investigations, which are currently in progress. But it seems possible that the technical solution could simply be: require 3 AOA sensors and require agreement between 2 out of 3 to activate MCAS. Of course, there are probably significant business and regulatory issues to consider/fix as well.