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"Several former Boeing engineers who were not directly involved in the system’s design said their colleagues most likely opted for such an approach since relying on two sensors could still create issues. If one of two sensors malfunctioned, the system could struggle to know which was right."

Shouldn't this have been more of a red flag not to rely on a single sensor when human lives are literally at stake?



I suspect their reasoning was: It only trims down by 0.6°, what does it matter if a faulty sensor accdentally activates it. The plane is still flyable slightly out of trim and the pilots can easily correct it.

The 0.6° number was what they said immediately after the Lion Air crash.

But their reasoning was wrong.

Turns out, MCAS was actually adjusting trim down by more like 1.5° and they never considered that a faulty sensor would trigger multiple MCAS activations and move the stablizer all the way to the end of it's range.




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