"I initially thought across borders/regulatory domains, blockchain will shine."
Massive institutions with billions of dollars at stake would rather have a predictable and stable regulatory regime to conduct transactions in the shadow of then to rely on a technical solution that supposedly obviates the need for one. Things come up -- bugs, acts of god, internal fraud, hacking, flash crashes, and so forth and so on. They want to be able to go to arbitrator and ask for a sensible and reasonable result and not be reliant on a totally inflexible mechanical rule set. Not the least of which because they can afford the very best lawyers to try to convince those arbitrators that what they want is sensible and reasonable.
A few years ago, a substantial amount of money was accidentally wired to my bank account. After about a month, I got a letter from the bank if I agreed on that money being wired back to the sender. I agreed, because I knew the implications.
With a technology like bitcoin, where receivers are pseudononymous, that would have never been possible.
Noone except for those who wish to remain pseudononymous will ever use bitcoin for any real-world scenarios. The costs are higher, the risks are higher, it doesn't scale, there are no checks and balances.
I don't want bitcoin for the same reason I don't want an AI to run national defenses.
I wonder if there's such a thing as Bitcoin address typosquatting. Especially targeting single bit typos (of busy wallets) to catch single bit errors. I guess, though, vanity wallet addresses are hard to create. Or maybe there's also a checksum that keeps this from working anyway.
There's a checksum, so your desired typosquatting address may not even be a valid address to begin with (the chance that it is valid is only 1 in 2^32). Even if it is a valid address it would be very very difficult to generate it. The difficulty of doing so would be at least as difficult as preimage attacks on both SHA-256 and RIPEMD-160.
Massive institutions with billions of dollars at stake would rather have a predictable and stable regulatory regime to conduct transactions in the shadow of then to rely on a technical solution that supposedly obviates the need for one. Things come up -- bugs, acts of god, internal fraud, hacking, flash crashes, and so forth and so on. They want to be able to go to arbitrator and ask for a sensible and reasonable result and not be reliant on a totally inflexible mechanical rule set. Not the least of which because they can afford the very best lawyers to try to convince those arbitrators that what they want is sensible and reasonable.