The biggest tangible benefit is you don't need to worry about NAT port mapping any more. Every device can have a public address, and you can have multiple servers exposing services on the same port without a conflict.
(The flip side is having a network-level firewall is more important than ever.)
You also don't have to worry about running a DHCP server anymore, at least on small networks. The simplicity of SLAAC is a breath of fresh air, and removes DHCP as a single point of failure for a network.
So the benefit is that you dont need to worry about NAT for a couple of port forwarded services you may use (which might well even use UPnP for auto setup), but the tradeoff is you now need to think about full individual firewall protection for every device on your network?
I'll take full security by default and forward a couple of ports thankyou!
NAT doesn't solve everything, and creates a whole new class of problems that you can just avoid by adopting IPv6 natively. And it's definitely not being ignored at larger companies.
In particular, just off the top of my head...
- T-Mobile US doesn't even assign clients an IPv4 address anymore. Their entire network is IPv6 native.
- Many cloud providers charge extra for IPv4 addresses, but give IPv6 addresses out for free.
For trivial cases NAT is easy, for complex situations it's a nightmare. I've been fighting a lonely battle against multiple-NAT VPNs as being the solution to the wrong problem for longer than I care to remember, and I'm tired boss. A few years ago we had a client site go offline because a local network guy just didn't like IPv6 and turned it off, not realizing that a huge amount of stuff was happening automatically and that's why he hadn't been needing to work on it.
They do not used bottled (or boxed) water for coffee.
That comes from the coffee machine built into the galley, which uses the aircraft’s onboard potable water tanks.
Those tanks are filled from a hose by the ground crew during refueling.
(At least for major US airlines. I understand some other carriers serve instant coffee packets. Even then, the hot water still comes from the aircraft tanks.)
I wonder how air Canada reconciles this. There was a popular globe and mail article a while ago that gave awful rankings to air Canada's water tanks -- so the company put up signs in the bathroom saying the water is non-potable and called it a day.
Not super comforting if they're then using the same 'non-potable' water to make coffee...
Is there any reason to expect there would be "toxins", given that it's just water? I can imagine how there might be accumulated toxins it's a pack of chicken breasts left in a hot car for 8 hours, but if it's water it should be fine? After all, boiling water is a tried and true way of making water safe to drink.
Yes, there are substances that slip through, but it works well enough for most cases that it's probably fine. Otherwise you get into weird edge cases like "what if there are prions in the water?!?" or whatever.
Heavy metals are a big problem, especially from cheap brass fittings common in outdoor water hoses.
Indoor plumbing, by contrast, uses copper and/or plex tubing and so there’s near zero risk of metal poisoning (caveat on cheap plex fittings- don’t do that.)
AOL was it's own network, completely parallel to the internet. It didn't use TCP/IP, it used a propritary transport called P3 - heavily optimized for dialup.
They had their own dedicated client app, where each page loaded in its own window. It didn't use HTML, it used something called "Rainman". URLs weren't a thing, you accessed "channels" (pages) by entering a specific "keyword".
Later on, in 1993, they added support for Usenet (see: "Eternal September"). Then in 1994 they added support for Gopher and WWW. So you could dial into the AOL client, and then open a regular web browser. But for most home users, there was more content in the AOL walled garden, so the web was something of a curiosity at first.
So to answer your question: It wasn't an artificial limitation. AOL was designed in a way that was fundamentally alien to the way the Internet + Web evolved.
(At some point, you could connect to AOL over TCP/IP - useful if you had a broadband Internet connection but still wanted access to content on the AOL network. This was done by encapsulating P3 inside a TCP/IP header. You still had to use the AOL client software and have an AOL membership.)
The problem is every aircraft model flies differently. The remote pilot would need to be familiar with that particular type of aircraft to safely land it.
I'm thinking of higher-level contributions such looking at the weather and saying 'fly to this airport and use this runway'; or asking the passenger, 'what does this gauge say?' or 'look at the left engine; what do you see?'; or talking to air traffic control.
That's a really big if, especially since not all traffic has a transponder, and not all airports are towered.
It would need to understand how to visually look for traffic with a camera, and understand what intentions other pilots are communicating on the radio.
> Is it actually common for military aircrafts with transponders off to mix and match with public traffic in activate flight regions?
As a pilot, I can tell you it happens all the time. Even in US domestic airspace. Transponder use is optional for the military, and they will turn them off for some training missions. (Or in this case, a real mission.)
No, they don't close the airspace when this is being done.
The pilots of both aircraft (civilian and military) are supposed to be keeping a constant visual watch for traffic. The military aircraft should also be keeping an eye on primary radar.
(Transponder use is also optional for some civilian aircraft, btw.)
> The pilots of both aircraft are supposed to be keeping a constant visual watch for traffic.
How's that supposed to work with Instrument Flight Rules, for which you literally train by wearing glasses which block your view outside the window [0]? And how are you supposed to spot an airplane coming at you with a closing speed of 1000 mph (1600 kmh)? It'll go from impossible-to-see to collision in a few seconds - which is why you won't see any "they didn't look outside the window enough" in the report of accidents like Gol Transportes Aéreos Flight 1907.
The whole point of Air Traffic Control is to control air traffic. Sure, there's plenty of uncontrolled airspace where you do indeed have to look out for traffic, but it's uncontrolled precisely because it rarely if ever sees commercial traffic.
> How's that supposed to work with Instrument Flight Rules, for which you literally train by wearing glasses which block your view outside the window [0]?
If you're wearing "foggles" (the technical term is a "view limiting device"), you're legally required to have a safety pilot who is responsible for maintaining visual watch.
You never, ever wear those while flying solo.
> And how are you supposed to spot an airplane coming at you with a closing speed of 1000 mph (1600 kmh)?
First, this near-miss was with a refueling tanker, which only travels at normal large-jet speed and is quite large.
If it was a fighter jet, you're right, it would be very hard to see. But frankly, compared to a fighter jet, everyone else might as well be a stationary object in the sky in terms of speed and maneuverability - so you're just relying on the fighter jet not to hit you. (They also have onboard primary radar and other fancy toys - so you hope they have more situational awareness of non-participating aircraft.)
> The whole point of Air Traffic Control is to control air traffic. Sure, there's plenty of uncontrolled airspace where you do indeed have to look out for traffic, but it's uncontrolled precisely because it rarely if ever sees commercial traffic.
Most airspace below 18,000 feet is still "controlled airspace", even though you have to look out for traffic - including commercial traffic. The big jets don't like to stay down there any longer than they have to, but that doesn't mean they're not there.
Being on an IFR clearance only guarantees that you're deconflicted with other IFR traffic. There's always the risk that there's non-participating traffic, especially in visual conditions (VMC). Class A airspace and transponder-required airspace help reduce this risk, but it's never completely eliminated.
Also, more importantly: The military largely plays by their own rules, entirely outside of the FAA.
I've been buzzed by a flight of military helicopters in the New Mexico desert. Not intentionally, they just happened to overfly my tent, and I just happened to have cell service somehow. I checked ADSB and sure enough they were flying dark.
Not necessarily; the same remoteness that made cell signal sparse likely makes ADS-B ground stations unlikely. There has to be one in range for it to show up places like FlightAware. Plenty of dead spots; you can help expand the network! https://www.flightaware.com/adsb/piaware/build/
I have an ADS-B receiver on a computer here, and am overhead a number of flight paths for JBLM.
The above comment is accurate, plenty of local training helicopter flights will be fully or partly dark (lights and/or transponders off), looking at my receiver's raw output stream.
ADSB is not mandatory in the US below FL100 or FL180 (10000/18000 feet), that covers most helicopter flights.
It depends also on the website you are using to track. I have an ADSB receiver that publishes to multiple tracking websites (the same data, unfiltered), and not all of them publish all the data. Flightradar24 doesn't show most of the military aircraft - I can see them on my local tracking interface but they are not shown on their website.
> The pilots of both aircraft (civilian and military) are supposed to be keeping a constant visual watch for traffic. The military aircraft should also be keeping an eye on primary radar.
So in your opinion, that was went wrong here, the military/pilot of the refueling plane didn't actually keep visual watch for traffic nor radar?
I wasn't there and don't know all the facts, so I'm not going to attempt to assign blame in this specific instance.
But speaking generally, I'll just say: If you're flying in VMC conditions (good weather), you're always required to see-and-avoid. Even if you're on an IFR clearance. Everything else is just considered an aid for situational awareness.
> I wasn't there and don't know all the facts, so I'm not going to attempt to assign blame in this specific instance.
Didn't you already though? You said "pilots [..] are supposed to be keeping a constant visual watch for traffic", and considering one of the parties has a filed flight plan and had their transponder turned on, I can't really read it any way except "the pilots of the military aircraft didn't do what they were supposed to" which is implicitly blaming them, or am I missing some angle/interpretation of what you said?
I don't believe that would be incorrect, because of the context, but I'm curious why'd you suddenly hesitate to say it seems to be the fault of the military here, yet previous comment made that hint implicitly.
No, I stated the regulations, in reply to the parent comment about transponder rules.
I don't know what the weather conditions were, I don't know what the sight-picture was from each aircraft, I don't know if any equipment was malfunctioning, and we don't have a statement from the military pilot.
Many pilots are very hesitant to (publicly) assign blame in an incident without all the facts, since the details do matter. It's too easy to jump to conclusions otherwise.
> The idea that a position of authority means ~anything~ anymore is completely ridiculous.
In that case, should we just get rid of licensure for professional engineers while we're at it? No special education or experience needed to build a bridge, nuclear reactors, or life-critical systems... since authority is meaningless now in the age of the internet?
The medical field isn't perfect, but it's hubris to believe that most people will perform better at treating disease than somebody with 11 years (minimum) of specialized education and countless hours of experience in a real clinical setting.
(The flip side is having a network-level firewall is more important than ever.)
You also don't have to worry about running a DHCP server anymore, at least on small networks. The simplicity of SLAAC is a breath of fresh air, and removes DHCP as a single point of failure for a network.
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