Any realist assessment of the power structure in SK (in general, and much more so in the military) has to acknowledge the history and presence of US military in Korea.
The OP uses finite fields and fields are basically harmonic structures (think modular math). Assume the field is the numbers 0..n-1 MOD n. At (n-1) + 1 you will get n MOD n which is equivalent to 0 MOD n which is 0. Now assume n-1 approaches infinity; is 0 not ∞ ?
Another reading would see this "lawfare" narrative as a device to fool the citizenry. Both sides know they will get pardoned but by having "lawfare" give the impression (to the impressionable and propagandized public) that we do not have in this nation a ruling class that protects its own and does as it pleases.
Observe implies sentience that, without question, a neural net simply does not possess. "It" certainly 'records', or more specifically it 'maps', but there is no observer in sight (npi).
> mimic
LLM's do not mimic. The magic is mathematical and happening in the high dimensional space. If there is intrinsic underlying pattern and semantic affinities between process X (used in training) and process Y (used in application), it is very likely that both share proximity, possibly form, in some dimensions of the high dimensional model.
Something really off imho with a food writer that manages to insert foul matter vulgarity into food reviews. It's moved beyond cute into the 'wonder what ails this guy' territory.
? If I use something like Blake3 (which is super fast and emits gobs of good bits) and encode a node with say 512 bits of the hash, you are claiming that somehow I am vulnerable to tampering because the hash function is fast? What is the probable number of attempts to forge a document D' that hashes to the very same hash? And if the document in structured per a standard format, you have even less degrees of freedom in forging a fake. So yes, a Merkel tree definitely can provide very strong guarantees against tampering.
Fwiw, increasing the BLAKE3 output size beyond 256 bits doesn't add security, because the internal "chaining values" are still 256 bits regardless of the final output length. But 256 bits of security should be enough for any practical purpose.
Good to know. But does that also mean that e.g. splitting the full output to n 256 chunks would mean there is correlation between the chunks? (I always assumed one could grab any number of bits (from anywhere) in a cryptographic hash.)
You can take as many bytes from the output stream as you want, and they should all be indistinguishable from random to someone who can't guess the input. (Similar to how each of the bytes of a SHA-256 hash should appear independently random. I don't think that's a formal design goal in the SHA-2 spec, but in practice we'd be very surprised and worried if that property didn't hold.) But for example in the catastrophic case where someone found a collision in the default 256-bit BLAKE3 output, they would probably be able to construct colliding outputs of unlimited length with little additional effort.
Theoretically they even have a better security environment (since it is internal and they control users, code base and network) so the consensus mechanism may not even require BFT.
